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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO 
compensation in listed US firms during the 1994-2004 period. The results are consistent with 
agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO 
compensation in order to address the ‘investment horizon’ problem. The findings also suggest 
that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have 
been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock-option compensation and the 
adoption of broad-based stock-option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for 
several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives. 
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1.    Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, listed firms in the United States have experienced an explosion in 
the use of employee stock options, primarily at the executive echelon but also at the firm-
wide level. It is a topic that has garnered widespread media attention and has spurred an 
interesting array of academic research. In particular, economic literature provides several 
possible reasons behind a firm’s decision to adopt stock options as a part of employee 
compensation. First, stock options alleviate the agency problem and align managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders (Haugen and Senbet 1981). Stock options have a non-negative 
asymmetric payoff that produces monetary gains only after the share price exceeds the 
exercise price. This convex payoff function provides an incentive to managers to become less 
risk-averse in their project and strategy selection, thus improving investment and financial 
decisions (DeFusco et al. 1990, Guay 1999). 1 Second, compared to straight salary, stock 
options operate as an attracting, sorting and retaining mechanism since firms awarding stock 
options can attract specific types of employees, especially those with less risk-aversion and a 
higher willingness to exert effort (Oyer and Schaefer 2005, Oyer 2004). In addition, these 
employees would have an incentive to stay in the firm and hold on to their stock options 
rather than lose them by exiting the firm. Third, stock options can provide a solution in 
employee compensation for firms facing financial constraints (such as liquidity constraints, 
tax costs and financial reporting costs) since they do not influence cash flows (Core and Guay 
2001).2 
                                                 
1 This traditional view has recently been challenged by Ross (2004), who shows that an agent’s risk-taking 
tendency is influenced not only by the convexity effect of the fee schedule but also by its translation and 
magnification effects. The latter two effects, which can take any sign, describe the impact of the fee schedule 
due to translating the domain of the utility function and magnifying (or contracting) any gamble at the margin. 
As a result, options may be an ineffective way to make managers less risk averse. Interestingly, without 
making any assumptions about the agent’s utility function, Braido and Ferreira (2006) show that stock options 
can indeed induce managerial risk taking as long as the projects’ distributions are at least partially known. 
2 A fourth reason could be tax advantages, but this depends both on the type of stock option scheme and the 
country-specific tax regulation. 
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It is surprising that although there is ample empirical evidence on the determinants of 
the level of CEO stock options (e.g. Core and Guay 1999, Yermack 1995), there has been no 
empirical investigation on what actually prompts firms to adopt stock options for the 
purposes of CEO compensation. There are some studies that focus on the introduction of 
broad-based stock option plans for employee compensation (e.g. employee stock option 
plans, ESOs), which however cannot be used to infer conclusions for the case of CEOs.  
Unlike the straightforward agency theoretic rationale for CEO stock option adoption, 
the introduction of broad-based stock option plans is often intended to reduce unions’ 
bargaining power (Cramton et al. 2005), advance organizational cohesion (Pendleton 2006), 
and encourage the accumulation of firm-specific human capital (Blair et al. 2000). Moreover, 
the incentive power of broad-based stock option plans is adversely affected by free rider 
problems, especially in larger firms, and group norms (Lazear 2004, Oyer 2004). 
Furthermore, the incentive effects of firm-wide use of stock options are doubtful since the 
risk premia stemming from firms’ option-based compensation are far larger than the cost to 
(lower- and middle-level) employees of the resulting increases in effort (Oyer and Schaefer 
2005 and 2006). In this way, it is more likely that broad-based employee stock option plans 
are introduced for sorting and retention purposes in firms with high recruiting and retaining 
costs as well as in firms that find it difficult to cut nominal salaries and hence prefer to offset 
wage cuts with option packages (Ittner et al. 2003, Oyer and Schaefer 2005).3  
Moreover, the determinants of the decision to adopt CEO stock options do not need to 
be the same as the determinants of the level of CEO stock-option compensation. Particularly 
in the US, the portion of large listed firms using CEO stock options increased gradually from 
the early 1980s, in contrast to the level of CEO stock options awarded that increased 
                                                 
3 An additional factor could be that CEOs demand stock options because they are typically wealthier than lower- 
and middle-level employees. Using data from Swedish CEOs, Becker (2006) finds that non-firm CEO wealth is 
positively related to share-based incentives and explains the result with agency theory's premise that wealthier 
CEOs have less absolute risk aversion. 
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dramatically after the mid-1990s (Conyon and Murphy 2002). These diverse patterns 
illustrate that there could be different factors driving each trend (or, alternatively, similar 
factors could affect each trend in different ways).  
This paper addresses the surge of interest in the topic of incentive and sorting aspects of 
compensation structure by examining the determinants behind the adoption of stock options 
for the purposes of CEO compensation in US firms during the 1994-2004 period. It is 
important to clarify the difference between adoption and use of CEO stock options. Figure 1 
illustrates that the annual percentage of CEO stock option usage underestimates the 
percentage of CEOs that generally hold stock options of their firm. While the percentage of 
CEO stock option usage on an annual basis fluctuated between 66 percent and 77 percent 
during the 1994-2004 period, the percentage of CEOs with stock option awards and holdings 
increased steadily from 87 percent to 96 percent. Since most of the publicly listed US firms 
had adopted CEO stock options by the mid-1990s, it is interesting to examine whether the 
remaining firms are adopting CEO stock options due to economic theory predictions. This 
study utilizes Execucomp, which covers the period from 1992 to present and delivers data on 
executive compensation provided by the various SEC filings for firms in the S&P 1500 
index, and other supplemental S&P indices, as a result of SEC regulation in 1992.4 
The results in this research are consistent with agency costs and recruiting 
considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the 
‘investment horizon’ problem. In particular, it is found that the likelihood for adopting stock 
options as a part of CEO compensation is significantly increased by the incidence of CEO 
                                                 
4 The S&P 1500 Index includes all the companies in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 
indices and represents about 90% of the US equity market’s capitalization. The lack of a similarly rich dataset 
during the stock option explosion in the late 1980s and early 1990s does not allow the examination of the 
adoption of CEO stock options during that period. For instance, two datasets utilized in the academic literature 
on CEO compensation in the US during the 1980s that cannot be used in the context of determinants for 
adoption of CEO stock options are (a) the Forbes data from compensation surveys which have limited 
information on stock options, and (b) the Hall-Liebman data, which provide detailed information on stock 
options but contain an unbalanced sample of only 478 firms that are large and possibly less representative of 
the population of listed firms. 
Page 5 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 5
turnover, while it is decreased by CEO ownership and CEO age. These findings provide 
novel evidence with respect to the CEO stock option introduction, and they are consistent 
with models of employee sorting using variable compensation. Thus, the adoption of stock 
options, a form of variable pay, could be a way for a firm to address both incentives and 
selection concerns. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses and describes the 
empirical methodology. The findings are analyzed in Section 3, while a robustness check is 
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 offers a summary of the results and concludes. 
 
2.    Hypotheses and methodological approach 
2.1.    Hypotheses 
I consider several causes for adoption of CEO stock options, namely CEO turnover 
incidence, firm liquidity problems, the need to lengthen the horizon of CEO incentives, and 
agency costs.  
First, the incidence of CEO turnover is expected to increase significantly the likelihood 
to adopt stock options in the CEO compensation package as a result of firms’ effort to attract 
managerial talent, especially in the tight labor markets of the booming 1990s. Principal-agent 
theory argues that in cases of turnover and in the absence of verifiability of agent’s ability at 
the CEO position, the firm will prefer offering a contract related to some measure of firm 
performance (Harris and Holmstrom 1982, Haugen and Senbet 1981, Holmstrom 1979).5 In 
this way, instances of CEO turnover present a unique opportunity for the firm to design a new 
contract for the incoming CEO, thus addressing both ex-ante sorting and ex-post incentives. 
                                                 
5 Notably, the lack of knowledge about the agent’s ability as CEO is prevalent for both outsider and insider 
succession. 
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Another reason that is expected to contribute to the adoption of CEO stock options is 
the presence of liquidity constraints in firms since stock options do not require a cash outlay. 
Firms with liquidity problems would try to compensate their CEO by adopting stock options 
in order to compete effectively in the labor market for CEOs.  
A further determinant of CEO stock option introduction could be to alleviate the 
‘horizon problem’ of other compensation components. Based on the short-term focus of fixed 
and accounting-based CEO compensation and emphasizing the role of age in incentive 
contracts (i.e., when agents have expected tenures less than the investment’s life), the 
‘horizon problem’ hypothesis suggests that CEOs nearing retirement will choose safer and 
less R&D intensive projects in order to enhance accounting returns rather than choosing 
projects that would enhance firm’s efficiency in the long run (Dechow and Sloan 1991).6 In 
order to counteract this problem, firms should provide stock options to older CEOs.7 This 
compensation mechanism would alter the short-term focus of CEOs who are near retirement 
and promote investment selections that favor long-term shareholder interests. As a result of 
the ‘horizon problem’ in CEO incentives, CEO age is expected to be positively related with 
the adoption of CEO stock options. 
Agency considerations are also expected to affect the introduction of CEO stock options 
since agency costs are mitigated when the CEO owns a substantial stake in the firm. At the 
same time, from a portfolio theory point of view, a CEO who already owns a substantial stake 
                                                 
6  Besides the financial and labor economics literature, industrial organization literature also discusses the 
problem of ‘investment horizon’, particularly in the context of firm investments in regulated industries. For 
instance, Lewis and Sappington (1991) suggest the presence of a horizon problem when those who select 
investments are not the primary beneficiaries of these investments (i.e., agents with expected tenures less than 
the investment’s life), and they offer as examples state regulators who decide firm investments. As a result of 
the ‘myopic’ regulators not selecting projects with superior, but long-term performance, firms do not benefit 
from efficient investments. 
7 Also, from a personnel economics viewpoint, a not-so-obvious argument on the positive relation between CEO 
age and adoption of CEO stock options is that stock options could operate as a mandatory retirement factor. In 
particular, if the ratio of stock option compensation to total compensation is high and increases with age, then 
older CEOs would prefer to retire rather than work for a form of compensation for which there is a substantial 
possibility not to enjoy.  
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in her firm would become further undiversified by accepting stock option grants.8 This, in 
turn, could potentially compromise the risk-inducing properties of stock options, as the 
theoretical literature has recently shown for risk-averse CEOs who cannot hedge their options 
(Carpenter 2000, Lewellen 2006, Ross 2004).9  
 
2.2.    Sample and empirical methodology 
For the estimations of the determinants of stock option adoption as a part of CEO 
compensation, I obtain data on executive compensation and firm characteristics from the 
Execucomp and Compustat databases. Data on monthly stock returns were obtained from the 
Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) files. Concerning the variable on CEOs’ age 
(which is largely incomplete in Execucomp), comprehensive information was manually 
collected on executive biographies from firms’ annual reports, Hoovers Online, and the 
Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives.  
The initial starting pool began with 20,115 firm-year observations for CEO 
compensation included in Execucomp for the 1992-2004 period. 10  I create an indicator 
variable for firms that adopt stock options as a form of CEO compensation.11 This binary 
dependent variable (ADOPTit = 0/1) indicates whether a firm that did not give stock options to 
the CEO at year 2t −  and 1t −  does so at year t , where t  is an integer between 1994 and 
2004, inclusive. In other words, adopting firms were those observed as (No, No, Yes) in time 
                                                 
8 Besides company stock, a CEO is also undiversified in terms of human capital. As a result, the CEO may 
select less risky projects that would not be optimal for well-diversified outside investors (Fama 1980, Hall and 
Murphy 2002). 
9 For instance, Lewellen shows that for the median CEO portfolio, the magnification effect dominates the 
convexity effect, thus decreasing the CEO’s preference for volatility. Besides CEO ownership, a related CEO 
characteristic that influences a CEO’s attitude towards risk is a CEO’s wealth (Lewellen 2006, Ross 2004). 
Also, Carpenter notes that factors such as large asset value or distant evaluation date could reduce managerial 
risk-taking when the manager is risk averse. 
10 Execucomp typically contains firms in the S&P 1500 index and other supplemental S&P indices, except for 
years 1992 and 1993, when it includes only the S&P 500 firms and a small portion of medium- and small-
capitalization firms. 
11 When the CEO stock option value is zero or missing, we presume that the firm is not awarding the CEO with 
stock options. 
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( 2t − , 1t − , t ) whereas non-adopting firms are those observed as (No, No, No) in time 
( 2t − , 1t − , t ). I use two lagged periods to avoid random temporal changes in CEO 
compensation design, thus ensuring that the adoption of stock options is actual.12 Also, the 
two lagged periods refer to the same CEO to allow for the examination of the CEO turnover 
effect at time t . Moreover, in order to ensure that the firm indeed adopts stock options, the 
CEO should not have any pending (exercisable or unexercisable) firm stock options from the 
past, at years 2t − , and 1t − . 13  Indeed, when comparing this adoption measure with 
alternative ones having more lagged periods (e.g., 3 or 4), no inconsistency is found. The use 
of two lags in the adoption variable is preferred since stricter measurement options, in terms 
of additional lags, lead to a smaller sample. 
There are 157 observations of firms that changed their CEO compensation design to 
include stock options. In contrast, there are 752 observations of firms that consistently did not 
award stock options to their CEOs from year 2t −  to year t , thus creating a total sample of 
909 observations for the estimation of the determinants of adoption of CEO stock options. 
Figure 2 shows the number of firms, by year, that are found to adopt CEO stock options using 
the aforementioned methodology. 
The econometric specification for the logit estimation examining the likelihood of the 
introduction of CEO stock options is as follows:  
( )itittiitit dzxFADOPT εδγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+== −1,0)1Pr( ,  [1] 
where 0α  indicates the intercept term, itx  is a vector of variables concerning CEO 
characteristics, and turnover, , 1i tz −  is a vector of lagged variables regarding firm 
                                                 
12 The estimation results are robust to stricter measurements of the binary ADOPTit variable (e.g. to indicate 
whether a firm that did not give stock options to the CEO at years 3−t , 2−t  and 1−t  does so at year t ). 
However, stricter measurement options are not selected because they lead to smaller sample. 
13 In other words, Execucomp items SOPTEXER, SOPTEXSH, UEXNUMEX, UEXNUMUN, INMONEX and INMONUN 
must be zero at the same time that BLK_VALUE (and SOPTVAL/SOPTGRNT) is zero. The rationale behind this 
constraint is that maybe the CEO had received stock options much earlier in the past, possibly when she was 
not even the CEO. 
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characteristics, itd  are industry and year effects, and finally itε  specifies the error term. The 
firm variables are lagged by one period with the aim of capturing firm characteristics prior to 
a possible CEO turnover. ( )⋅F  represents the logistic cumulative distribution function used in 
logit analysis. In order to take into account the presence of repeated firm observations, 
standard errors are estimated with firm-clustering, thus allowing observations not to be 
independent within cluster. 
The likelihood of the dependent indicator variable (ADOPT) is examined using a 
multitude of explanatory variables concerning CEO and firm characteristics. More 
specifically, in order to test the hypotheses, I include CEO equity ownership, CEO age, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm has experienced a CEO turnover at year t . Also, 
following Yermack (1995) and Fazzari et al. (1988), I employ a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a firm pays zero dividends during the respective fiscal year, and 0 otherwise, as a proxy for 
firm’s liquidity constraints.14 In order to account for high growth firms that did not award 
dividends for reasons other than liquidity constraints, I interact the dividend dummy variable 
with Tobin’s Q. 15 Also, the inclusion of Tobin’s Q is well motivated since Q has been found 
to be related to the level of stock-option awards (Yermack 1995, Mehran 1995).  
Concerning control variables, I include CEO-Chairman duality, the natural logarithm 
of firm sales, three-year return to shareholders and three-year share volatility. Compared to a 
CEO who is not the Chairman of the Board, a CEO with dual responsibilities faces more 
complex tasks or is of higher ability, and thus may require more variable compensation. Firm 
size, proxied by sales, is used in compensation design as a proxy for managerial skill 
requirements, job complexity, and span of control (Murphy 1999). Also, consistently poor 
                                                 
14 Jin (2002) provides a more recent example of the use of dividends as a proxy for liquidity constraints. 
15 Tobin Q is calculated using the methodology outlined in Gompers et al. (2003). The market value of assets is 
divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the sum of book value of 
assets and the market value of common stock minus the sum of the book value of common stock and balance 
sheet deferred taxes. 
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firm performance, reflected in three-year return to shareholders, provides the grounds for 
alterations in executive compensation design. Firm risk, proxied by standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns (over three years), serves as an observed measure of uncertainty and is 
widely suggested by the literature to be associated to variable compensation schemes 
(Lazear). Since Execucomp’s measures for financial performance contain dividend 
reinvestment, I utilize the monthly holding period total return (which includes dividends and 
other distributions) for the calculation of firm volatility. 
Table 1 presents definitions, descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
aforementioned variables. Furthermore, in order to capture possible industry effects in 
compensation practices, I include dummies for one-digit SIC industries. I also incorporate 
year effects to capture possible aggregate time-trends or systematic changes associated with 
time that commonly influence the adoption of stock options in executive compensation 
design. Overall, after controlling for CEO/firm characteristics and industry/year effects, it is 
expected the coefficients for CEO turnover, CEO age and firm liquidity constraints to be 
positive and significant and the coefficient for CEO equity ownership to be negative and 
significant.  
 
3.    Analysis of results 
Table 2 presents the results (marginal effects) from logit estimations, where the 
dependent variable is an indicator of whether the firm adopts CEO stock options in a given 
year. Reporting the marginal effects offers insight on the relative importance of each 
explanatory variable in predicting the probability of a firm adopting CEO stock options. 
There are three alternative specifications for logit (Table 2, Columns I-III). The initial 
specification includes only CEO turnover and industry/year effects, and it is then 
supplemented with firm and CEO characteristics. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
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tests indicate that all specified models fit the data reasonably well.16 The results identify a 
number of factors behind the adoption of CEO stock options, namely the incidence of CEO 
turnover, CEO ownership, and CEO age.17  
Consistent with principal-agent theory, the incidence of CEO turnover significantly 
increases the likelihood to adopt stock options in the CEO compensation package. More 
specifically, after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, the result suggests that a firm 
experiencing CEO turnover is 30 percent more likely to adopt CEO stock options. Given the 
fact that sorting and screening costs increase with the significance of position in the firm, the 
introduction of stock options as a result of CEO turnover alleviates these costs through 
contractual choice. Alternatively, the significance of CEO turnover in the adoption of CEO 
stock options could be perceived as a signaling device for the new CEO to signal her 
commitment to the firm’s success, as well as to demonstrate confidence in her own abilities.18  
Moreover, CEO ownership has a significant negative effect on the adoption of CEO 
stock options. The estimation results show that an increase of one percent over the mean for 
CEO ownership will decrease the probability of CEO stock option adoption by 0.5 percent. 
This magnitude appears small due to the wide distribution of CEO ownership; thus marginal 
effects using standard deviation difference are more meaningful economically. When the 
CEO ownership changes on  standard deviation (±0.5σ) around its mean (i.e. from 3.3 
percent to 15.5 percent), the probability of CEO stock option adoption decreases by 6 
                                                 
16 Also, the outcomes predicted by the models correctly classify about 86 percent of the actual outcomes. 
17 Notably, the results for the hypotheses are robust in alternative estimations that are not included in this paper 
for brevity purposes. Such estimations are [a] running logit regression separately on firms with or without 
CEO turnover (in the case of the sub-sample without CEO turnover, the firm characteristics are 
contemporaneous instead of lagged), [b] splitting the sample into smaller and larger firms and running logit 
estimations separately, and [c] running logit regressions by year groups in order to tackle possible stickiness 
for some independent variables due to repeated firm observations in the sample. 
18 The positive effect of CEO turnover is not altered by CEO ownership or age; when the interactions (Turnover 
× CEO ownership) and (Turnover × CEO age) are included in the specifications, their coefficients are 
insignificant. Similarly, the positive effect of turnover is not altered when an interaction is added to indicate 
insider succession (albeit with reduced sample size due to missing observation on executive tenure in the 
firm), thus illustrating that stock-option compensation was less widespread to executives other than the CEO, 
a point also raised in Yermack. 
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percent, other things being equal. These findings verify the hypothesis that the incentives of 
CEOs with high firm ownership are already adequately aligned with those of shareholders, 
thus adopting stock options would provide little additional incentives and render the CEO 
further undiversified.  
Another important finding is the rejection of the ‘horizon problem’ hypothesis 
according to which CEOs near retirement should receive stock option compensation. In 
particular, it is found that CEO age has a strong negative relation with the adoption of CEO 
stock option compensation. The marginal effect for CEO age illustrates that an increase in 
age of one year will decrease the probability of CEO stock option adoption by 0.4 percent. 
From an economic significance point of view, the negative coefficient is higher when one 
employs indicator variables , rather than a continuous measure, for CEO age. For instance, 
the marginal effect of a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is over 60 years old 
(thus nears retirement age) is -7.5 percent.19 One explanation for the negative age effect could 
be the long-term character of stock options that reduce the likelihood of exercising these 
options for CEOs who are near retirement. In the same way, given that stock options could 
serve as a retention mechanism, firms’ retention concerns are lesser for CEOs nearing 
retirement compared to younger CEOs who are more likely to get an offer from another firm. 
Another explanation could be Eaton and Rosen’s (1983) suggestion that risk aversion may 
increase with age, thus influencing the individual’s preferences for risky compensation such 
as stock options.20 A fourth explanation could be that markets are well aware of the quality of 
CEOs near retirement. This point is related to Gibbons and Murphy’s (1992) theory on career 
concerns, which predicts that the variance in the estimate of the CEO’s ability declines over 
                                                 
19 When the continuous variable on CEO age is replaced by a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is 
near retirement (i.e. the CEO is over 57 years old or, alternatively, over 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 62 or 64 years old), 
the marginal effect is negative and significant. Moreover, the negative marginal effect of the age dummy is 
gradually amplified from -5.8 percent for the ‘CEO is over 57 years old’ dummy to -9.7 percent for the ‘CEO 
is over 64 years old’ dummy, while consistently remaining highly significant. 
20  Empirical evidence on the relation between age and risk aversion shows that being age 65 or older 
dramatically increases one’s risk aversion (Riley and Chow 1992, Halek and Eisenhauer 2001). 
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time. As a result, the compensation package of older CEOs would be dominated by fixed 
and/or accounting-based compensation components. 
Moreover, the estimate for the dividend dummy is insignificant, suggesting no 
association between firm liquidity constraints and the likelihood of adoption of CEO stock 
options. The relationship between dividend dummy and stock option adoption remains 
insignificant when the dummy variable for dividend yield is replaced with a continuous 
variable for dividend yield.21 The validity of this finding is strengthened by the fact that in the 
absence of stock options, CEOs do not have the incentive to reduce dividends in order to 
increase the value of their option awards. 
There are also some interesting findings from the control variables. Firm size does not 
play a significant role in the adoption of CEO stock options, thus refuting the notion that 
CEO stock options are mostly adopted in larger firms due to greater monitoring problems. 
This finding is robust to alternative proxies for firm size, such as firm assets, market value, 
and number of employees. Regarding firm performance, there is no evidence that three-year 
financial performance is positively related to the likelihood to adopt CEO stock options. 
Similarly, alternative measures of firm performance (e.g. return on equity, sales growth) yield 
insignificant coefficients. The fact that firm performance does not significantly affect the 
likelihood of CEO stock option introduction could be partly attributed to the soaring bull 
markets in the United States throughout the 1990s that blurred the distinction of firms with 
poor performance. In this way, poor performance was not identified easily as affecting the 
likelihood of adopting CEO stock options as a remedy for poor decision making by 
successfully aligning CEO incentives to firm value. Besides financial performance, another 
                                                 
21 Results available upon request. 
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factor that is related to the level of stock options but not the adoption is growth opportunities, 
proxied by Tobin’s Q, which is found to be significant in the estimations.22 
Consistent with standard agency theory predictions for agents with high discretion and 
high output uncertainty, share price volatility significantly increases the probability of 
adopting CEO stock options. Firms with volatile returns need to utilize incentive 
compensation with non-linear payoffs, such as stock-options, in order to protect the risk-
averse CEO from downside risk while increasing the incentive power of executive 
compensation (Prendergast 2002). Moreover, interesting findings come from the Utilities 
dummy (i.e. firms with SIC 49) in Table 2, Column III. In the fairly regulated US utilities 
sector, firms are found to have a significantly lower likelihood to adopt CEO stock options. 
This is consistent with Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) argument that political and regulatory 
pressures impede the efficient design of CEO compensation and with previous evidence on 
the negative effect of utility firms on the level of CEO stock option compensation (Yermack 
1995, Bryan et al. 2000). From another viewpoint, utilities firms are found to trail behind in 
the adoption of CEO stock options compared to firms in other industries because they operate 
in a rather certain environment characterized by little R&D investment and local monopoly 
markets. Since utility firms do not need to increase efficiency under high levels of 
uncertainty, the structure of their CEOs’ incentives design differs from other industries 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
The findings on the adoption of CEO stock options contrast with the results from 
previous studies on the determinants of the level of CEO stock option awards. For instance, 
regarding CEO ownership, several studies have found no significant relation with the level of 
CEO stock options (Lewellen et al. 1987, Matsunaga 1995, Yermack 1995, Kole 1997). Also, 
concerning CEO age and the level of CEO options, no significant relation has been found by 
                                                 
22 Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) find a positive relation between equity compensation 
and growth opportunities, whereas Yermack finds a negative relation. 
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Eaton and Rosen (1983) and Yermack (1995), while Lewellen et al. report a positive relation. 
These contrasting results confirm that the adoption and the level of CEO stock options are not 
necessarily influenced by the same factors. 
The paper’s findings also provide a contrast with the literature’s determinants for the 
adoption (and level) of broad-based employee stock option awards. Concerning firm size, 
previous studies on the introduction of broad-based employee stock options have uniformly 
found a positive relation with firm size (Core and Guay) and financing constraints (Smith and 
Watts). Nevertheless, in this study no such relations are found, thus illustrating that firm size 
was not a factor for listed US firms during the 1994-2004 period when they decided to adopt 
CEO stock option compensation. This is reasonable because the introduction of CEO stock 
options does not need the economies of scale for plan administration that are crucial for a 
broad-based employee stock option plan. Similar rationale probably holds for the case of 
liquidity constraints, which are found to affect the adoption of broad-based employee stock 
option plans positively, but not the adoption of CEO stock options.  
 
4.    Robustness Check 
In this section, I provide an important robustness check of the results obtained from 
logit estimation on adoption of CEO stock options by using multinomial logit estimation. In 
terms of empirical design, the logit estimation strategy [1] recognizes only two types of firm 
action in a single estimation, namely, (a) not having CEO stock options at 2−t  and 1−t , but 
at time t  adopting CEO stock options, and (b) not having stock options throughout 2−t , 
1−t  and t . In this way, I examine the determinants for the firm’s decision to start awarding 
CEO stock options. 
As a robustness check, I repeat the same specification with [1], while taking into 
account firms that had adopted stock options before the beginning of the sample period and 
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that appear to award CEO stock options either regularly or temporarily. For this purpose, 
using the same specification with [1], I perform a multinomial logit estimation procedure 
where the dependent variable contains all mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive un-
ordered alternatives outcomes (i.e., possible firm decisions for awarding CEO stock options 
in three consecutive years), which allows for complete representation of the choice process. 
The multinomial logit is employed as a robustness check because its estimation involves a 
larger sample (13,042 instead of 909 observations) and set of alternatives (4 instead of 2), 
thus allowing for further heterogeneity across firms.23 
Table 3 explains the four possible outcomes used in the multinomial logit estimation, 
while Table 4 presents the estimates of multinomial logit for the ‘Adoption’ outcome (i.e., 
No, No, Yes respectively in 2t − , 1t − , t ).24 The findings confirm that CEO turnover, 
ownership, and age are factors robustly influencing the adoption of CEO stock options. It is 
also found that utility firms have a significant lower likelihood to adopt CEO stock options 
than the other firms. Furthermore, the results from the multinomial logit estimation 
corroborate the finding that CEO duality, firm liquidity, firm size and financial performance 
are factors not influencing a firm’s decision to start awarding its CEO with stock options. 
Finally, in all logit and multinomial logit estimations, the year dummies are not significant, 
                                                 
23 The remaining Execucomp observations (i.e., 20115-13042=7073 obs.) are not included for two reasons. 
First, we need two lags for each company to construct the dependent variables. Since Execucomp starts from 
1992, then by default the sample starts from 1994. Also the unbalanced nature of Execucomp sample means 
that some firms are not included because they do not have enough lags. This reason accounts for 5308 
observations, mostly for the years before 1995. Second, in order to estimate the effect of CEO turnover on 
CEO stock option adoption, we require the same CEO to be in office for t-1 and t-2 (so at t, either she remains 
or the firm experiences CEO turnover). The final sample thus excludes 1765 observations from firms that 
either had three different CEOs within three years (e.g. using an interim CEO while searching for the future 
CEO), or the turnover happened at t-1 and cannot be directly connected with the incidence of CEO adoption at 
time t. 
24 For the multinomial logit estimation, the coefficient estimates are presented in lieu of the marginal effects 
since the latter cannot be clearly interpreted (Greene 2000). 
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reflecting the lack of any systemic changes, such as regulatory intervention, in the decision to 
award CEO stock options.25 
 
5.    Conclusion 
The role of designing optimal compensation contracts is to align the otherwise 
unobservable managerial actions with shareholders’ desires. This paper examines the effect 
of CEO and firm characteristics on the introduction of CEO stock options in a large number 
of firms in the United States during the 1994-2004 period. The primary research hypothesis is 
that the adoption of a CEO stock option plan occurs as a result of agency costs, search for 
managerial talent, liquidity constraints, and investment horizon considerations. The results 
provide evidence for several economic theory predictions. In particular, it is found that the 
likelihood for adopting stock options as a part of CEO compensation is significantly 
decreased by CEO ownership and CEO age, while it is increased by the incidence of CEO 
turnover. Overall, these results provide a novel insight into the executive compensation 
literature by demonstrating the extent to which firm and CEO characteristics are related to 
firms’ decision to adopt stock options for the purposes of CEO compensation. 
                                                 
25 Indeed, during the sample period (1994-2004), the accounting for stock options was generally based on rule 
25/1972 by the Accounting Principles Board (the predecessor to the Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
FASB Statement 123 in 1995 recommended some alterations in the way firms expense the cost of stock 
options, but its voluntary character resulted in very few companies implementing this guideline. 
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Figure 1:   Descriptive statistics for use of CEO stock options in S&P 1500 firms 
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Source: Execucomp 
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Figure 2:   Adoption of stock options in CEO compensation in S&P 1500 firms 
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Note: The source for this figure is the Execucomp database sing the methodology 
outlined in Section 2.2. Execucomp typically includes firms in the S&P 1500 index (and 
other supplemental S&P indices) except for years 1992 and 1993, when it includes only 
the S&P 500 firms and a small portion of medium- and small-capitalization firms. As a 
result, the number of firms that adopt CEO stock options in 1994 and 1995 may be 
lower than the respective number for the S&P 1500 in those years. 
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Table 1:   Descriptive statistics of variables for analysis 
 
 Variables Definition Mean St.Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CEO Turnover Dummy variable taking value 1, if there was a change of 
persons in CEO position, and 0 otherwise. 
0.12 0.32  -0.26* -0.25* -0.34* -0.07* -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 
2 CEO Ownership CEO’s stock ownership of the firm, as a percentage of the 
total outstanding shares – in percentage form 
9.44 12.22 -0.21*  0.13* 0.11* -0.24* 0.08* 0.27* 0.42* 0.43* 
3 CEO Age CEO’s age (in years) at the end of the fiscal year 58.01 9.83 -0.22* 0.07*  0.28* 0.00 0.00 -0.16* -0.05 -0.05 
4 CEO is Chairman Dummy variable taking value 1, if the CEO is also the 
firm’s Chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. 
0.70 0.45 -0.34* 0.16* 0.25*  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.06 
5 Firm sales Firm size, in terms of firm’s annual sales  – in $billion 2.33 4.51 0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.02  0.07* -0.17* -0.15* -0.31* 
6 Return to shareholder 
(3 yrs) 
Three year total return to shareholders, including the 
monthly reinvestment of dividends - in percentage form 
12.18 22.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.05  0.02 0.41* -0.01 
7 Dividend dummy Dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm pays zero dividends 
during the respective fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
0.28 0.44 -0.06 0.24* -0.18* 0.00 0.00 0.04  0.29* 0.55* 
8 Tobin’s Q (BV of Assets + MV of Common Stock - BV of Common 
Stock - Deferred taxes) / BV of Assets 
2.19 1.96 -0.03 0.18* -0.14* 0.00 0.02 0.55* 0.26*  0.35* 
9 Firm risk Standard deviation of monthly firm returns over three years 9.63 5.49 0.02 0.19* -0.16* -0.05 -0.14* -0.04 0.56* 0.26*  
 
Definitions and descriptive statistics for independent variables used in logit analysis for adoption of stock options in their CEO compensation design are given below. Pearson 
and Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in the estimations are reported below and above the diagonal, respectively. The asterisk (*) denotes 
two-tailed significance levels equal or less than 0.05 ( 0.05a ≤ ). The pooled sample contains a panel of 909 observations in the 1994-2004 period. Data was obtained from 
S&P Execucomp, S&P Compustat, CRSP, Hoovers Online, and S&P Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. The variable for firm sales is adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 2:   Determinants of the adoption of CEO stock option awards 
 
 D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  Pr (ADOPT=1) 
Independent Variables Logit estimation  Logit estimation  Logit estimation 
 I II III 
CEO Turnover 0.427*** 
(7.37) 
0.302*** 
(4.28) 
0.291*** 
(4.12) 
CEO Ownership — -0.0049*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.0057*** 
(-4.00) 
CEO Age — -0.0046*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.0048*** 
(-3.99) 
CEO is Chairman — -0.005 
(-0.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.27) 
ln Firm sales t-1 — 0.0004 
(0.05) 
0.0003 
(0.04) 
Return to shareholders (3yr)  t-1 — 0.0004 
(0.74) 
0.0004 
(0.77) 
Dividend dummy  t-1 — 0.042 
(0.87) 
0.036 
(0.79) 
(Dividend dummy × Tobin Q)  t-1 — -0.008 
(-0.68) 
-0.008 
(-0.71) 
Tobin’s Q  t-1 — -0.004 
(-0.79) 
-0.006 
(-1.04) 
Firm risk  t-1 — 0.007*** 
(3.18) 
0.007*** 
(3.02) 
Utilities — — -0.104*** 
(-3.97) 
Industry effects (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 909  843  843 
Pseudo R2 0.157  0.239  0.245 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  (p-value) (0.980)  (0.364)  (0.584) 
 
Specifications I-III present three alternative logit specifications for the likelihood to adopt CEO stock 
options. Coefficients are marginal effects on the probability that a firm adopts CEO stock options. 
Marginal effects for binary independent variables denote the discrete change in probability for 
adopting CEO stock option as the binary variable changes from 0 to 1. All logits were run with a 
constant term. Number of observations differs between specifications due to missing observations in 
some variables. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and estimated using the Huber-White 
estimator of variance; the values of z-statistics appear in parentheses below each marginal effect. 
Asterisks denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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Table 3:   Outcomes of dependent variable for multinomial logit estimation 
 
 Award CEO stock options at time:  
 t – 2 t – 1 t Observations (%)
 Outcome = 0   [no-use of stock options] No No No 752  (5.8%) 
 Outcome = 1   [adoption of stock options] No No Yes 157  (1.2%)  
 Outcome = 2   [regular use of stock options] Yes Yes Yes 7262  (55.7%) 
 Outcome = 3   [temporary changes in use of SO] Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 4871  (37.3%) 
Total     13042  (100%) 
 
The sample employed for the multinomial logit estimation (presented in Table 4) contains 13042 firms with at least 
three consecutive years in Execucomp. The firms in this sample cover the period 1994-2004 and can be partitioned 
into four categories (0 to 3) based on the presence of CEO stock options as a part of their CEO compensation 
package in three consecutive years. A model employing these four categories is fully saturated since the variables 
are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Outcome ‘3’ contains all temporary changes in CEO 
compensation changes in the use of stock options (i.e. YYN, YNY, YNN, NYY, NYN) as well as cases of CEOs being 
awarded stock options not during but prior to a three year period. Notably, the logit regressions in Table 2 (Column 
I) are based on the first two outcomes (i.e. 752 plus 157 equals 909 observations). Finally, time t takes values 
between 1994 and 2004, inclusive. 
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Table 4:   Robustness check for determinants of the adoption of CEO stock option awards 
 
 D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  Pr (OUTCOME=1) 
Independent Variables 
Multinomial logit 
estimation 
 Multinomial logit 
estimation 
 Multinomial logit 
estimation 
 I II III 
Constant -1.728*** 
(-3.50) 
3.571*** 
(2.43) 
4.140*** 
(2.69) 
CEO Turnover 2.268*** 
(9.26) 
1.953*** 
(7.11) 
1.957*** 
(7.12) 
CEO Ownership — -0.027*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.82) 
CEO Age — -0.064*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.78) 
CEO is Chairman — -0.026 
(-0.11) 
-0.036 
(-0.15) 
ln Firm sales t-1 — 0.032 
(0.45) 
0.019 
(0.26) 
Return to shareholders (3yr)  t-1 — 0.007* 
(1.69) 
0.006 
(1.50) 
Dividend dummy  t-1 — -0.191 
(-0.57) 
-0.175 
(-0.51) 
(Dividend dummy × Tobin Q)  t-1 — 0.018 
(0.22) 
0.022 
(0.29) 
Tobin’s Q  t-1 — -0.175** 
(-2.27) 
-0.168** 
(-2.43) 
Firm risk  t-1 — 0.101*** 
(3.82) 
0.082*** 
(3.19) 
Utilities — — -0.673 
(-1.53) 
Industry effects (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 13042  12121  12121 
Pseudo R2 0.032  0.099  0.105 
      
 
Specifications I-III contain the results for the Pr (OUTCOME=1) from a multinomial logit estimation 
employing all four possible outcomes regarding the inclusion of stock option in CEO compensation 
in three consecutive years, as presented in Table 3. The base outcome is ‘no use of stock options’ 
(OUTCOME=0) and the remaining outcomes pass the Hausman-McFadden test for the IIA 
assumption. The pseudo-R2 counts all four possible outcomes. Number of observations differs 
between specifications due to missing observations in some variables. Standard errors are adjusted 
for firm-clustering and estimated using the Huber-White estimator of variance; the values of z-
statistics appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at 1 
percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
